Bibl.: «The International Journal of Albanian Studies», Columbia University, New York, I (1997), N. 1 (Fall): 69-81
Giovanni Armillotta
ALBANIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
TWO CASES SEEN FROM A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY PERSPECTIVE
1. Background to Albanian Foreign Policy during 1944-1991
The emergence of the new power relations on the global
scene at the end of the WW II had created a series of problems in the field
of international relations for small Countries like Albania. How was Albania
going to be integrated in the new post-war international system? It was
quite obvious that being in imminent danger of annexation from its neighboring
Countries the fundamental question to be solved was the matter of its existence
as a State. This preoccupation with the existence of Albania as a State
determined the character of the War of National-Liberation and the structure
of motivations behind the actions of the Albanian combatants, partisans
and nationalists alike.
The War of National-Liberation (1939-1944) had to be
conducted at two different but interrelated levels. At the first level,
the Albanians had to fight to defeat the Germans who, replacing the Italians,
had occupied Albania in the Fall of 1943. At the second level, the uncertain
intentions of the members of the Allies mirrored in the Albanian domestic
politics, had created a rift within Albanian resistance with two major
factions fighting one-another. On one hand, the presumed British intentions
to accommodate the expansionist and chauvinist elements of Greek resistance
that could be used as a bulwark to a future expansion of Communism were
viewed with suspicion by Hoxha and Communists. On the other hand, the Soviet
attempts to reward Tito and Yugoslavia –aimed towards the creation of a
Soviet dominated sphere of influence in Balkans leaving Albania to Yugoslavia,
a project very dear to Stalin but also to Churchill–were viewed with similar
suspicion by Albanian nationalists. Each side had a partially correct reading
of the international relations and the future international system. And
yet, both sides were blinded by their mistaken ideological systems of beliefs.
Under great pressure from the Albanian people in general
and their fiercely nationalistic supporters in particular, the faction
which prevailed, although clearly pro-Soviet and pro-Yugoslav, was forced
to fight to secure the diplomatic and the international recognition of
Albania, something that run against their Marxist and internationalist
ideological beliefs. In the very complex situation of the time, Enver Hoxha
and his inexperienced provisional government chose to pursue intensively
the first goal, that is, the preservation of the integrity of Albania.
Thus, in the general framework of international relations, it must be noted
that this constant preoccupation with security has dominated the long-term
post-War Albanian foreign policy also (1).
Unfortunately, their choice was charged with ideological overtones that
later backfired. At the time of war, this future foreign policy was clearly
beginning to crystallize with the annulment of all international treaties
to which previous Albanian governments had adhered to in the past, a decision
taken in the Congress of Përmeti (2).
The other side of this aggressive and nationalist foreign policy was that
most of these measures imitated the Yugoslav model or were introduced by
Yugoslav advisors who were seeking a further isolation of Albania, apparently
in order to annex it more easily (3).
While one can dispute the role of Yugoslavs in all this matter and their
long-term policy goals, it must be said that although the Communist ideology
did play an important role in the War of National Liberation, the fierce
nationalism of Albanians forced the Albanian Communist to modify their
stand in many fundamental doctrinal issues. Thus, the paradox is that although
it was ruled by Communists, Albania, was the only State of a small to a
middle size that was not used by communism, like for example, Cuba.
In reality, the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha, used the
communism to protect himself and only then defend its nation-State, ethnically
homogeneous but deeply divided at the societal level (4).
The Albanian choice has represented the only viable solution to unify a
people that not only witnessed the division of its ethnic territories,
similarly to the emblematic African examples divided between very different
States, but it also had continued to recreate the divisive indigenous premises
of the identification with clans, a tradition whose bases are to be found
in the orography of the Country, a rugged mountainous region and whose
origins are to be traced in antiquity (5).
It is important to note that the Romanization and the later tentatives
for assimilation were successfully resisted particularly by Clans of Mountaineers
and Highlanders, sometimes isolated even from each other. These clans preserved
traditions and ethnic values obstinately, to the point that we find their
resistance quoted by many scholars of ancient world. It is not just a mere
coincidence that after two thousands years, Albanians fought their War
of Liberation without substantial foreign assistance (6).
2. The Fundamentals of Albanian Foreign Policy
The fundamental characteristic of Albanian foreign policy has been the constant preoccupation of Albanians with the existence of their State and the security of it from the chauvinistic attempts of its neighbors to divide Albania among themselves or to annex it. Another fundamental aspect of Albanian foreign policy is the shift from a period of intense “proletarian” internationalism that saw Albania shift from a close alliance with Yugoslavia (1944-1948) (7) to another with Soviet Union (1948-1961) and later with People’s Republic of China (1961-1978) to an almost xenophobic policy after late 1970’s. The unscrupulous use of the nationalism and nationalist sentiments by Hoxha and the application of the Hobbesian model of State-building which was manifested in an extremely Realist foreign policy, are the keys to understanding Albanian foreign policy during this period of time. Therefore, in order to understand Albania of the 1944-1991, one must understand these absolutely indigenous and original interpretations of the principle of the political-economical independence of the State and its relationship to other Countries buttressed with a distinct interpretation of Marxist dogma. It also must be noted that in so far the Albanian policy-makers’ system of beliefs is concerned, they were convinced that the Cold War bipolar system was going to last for a while, one of their major arguments being the nuclear deterrence. In this context, Albanians chose to vocally denounce the superpowers, with the obvious result that they were tolerated by both of them; Albanians policy makers gave guarantees that Albania was not going to go into the opposite camp and assurances that in the maverick Albanian case the domino theory was not going to be proven true. The incompatibility of the principles of the absolute independence with the principle of “limited sovereignty” was a truism to Albanian policy makers. Their adherence to the first principle did transform Albania in an autonomous Hobbesian entity, a unique case in the recent diplomatic history. Albania’s preoccupation with its neighboring Countries is a key to explain its policy even towards international organizations and alliance formations. However, it is the contention of this essay that independently of the nature of its totalitarian domestic regime, Albania was an important element of stability in the region and a trusted member of the international community which acted freely and without the constraints imposed by unequal alliances that dominated the Cold War period.
3. Albania, Alliances, and International Community
Albania was not admitted to the United Nations until 1955.
Between 1944 and 1961, Albania had belonged exclusively to the Communist
camp. Allied to Yugoslavia (1944-1948) and later to Soviet Union (1948-1961)
Albania became a member of Warsaw Pact in 1955 and a member of COMECON.
In all effects, the consolidation of the new Albanian State during 1944-1955
happened while the Country was in the orbit of the Soviet Union. After
the rapprochement between Titoist Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in 1956-1961,
when its need to strengthen and use its geopolitical position became acute,
Albania progressively moved out of the Soviet orbit and allied itself with
China, an alliance that lasted until 1978. Albania’s alliance with China,
however, was used by Albanian policy makers to solve security, military
and economical problems to their advantage. Although involved in a bilateral
unequal alliance, Byberaj has noted that «China could not force Albania
to modify its foreign policy or prevent Tirane’s dealignment» (8).
After the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968
officially – but de facto since its rupture with Soviet Union in
1961 – Albania had withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact and it did not belong
to any of the military blocks or alliances that directly or indirectly
would have had influenced Albania to become hostile to a third party (9).
Albania did not adhere to Conventions and Agreements that would link it
– no matter how little – to other States’ interests. For example, when
Albanian policy makers became convinced that WHO (World Health Organization)
FAO and UNESCO were being used by the superpowers, Albania did not hesitate
to withdraw from that organization in 1965. It must be noted that although
Albania’s withdrawal coincided with that of some other Communist States,
it was done for quite different motives (10).
Furthermore, the Constitution of the 1976 and other Fundamental
Laws of the Albania forbade the construction of the foreign military bases
in the Country and any kind of such installations. There were no facilities
offered to the foreign military forces not even in the form of brief stay,
transit, or passage. Tirana was tireless in repeating that dismantling
of military alliances, especially that of Warsaw Pact, constituted a fundamental
pre-condition for the preservation of the peace and the relaxation of the
tensions in all over the world. Therefore, it is safe to assert that Albania,
the only European Country to have been liberated without any help from
outside, appeared on the international arena as a free and a sovereign
Country and not only formally.
Since 1961, Albania begun to establish diplomatic relations
with most Countries, except with Moscow, London and Washington. Declaring
on one hand that it based its relations on mutual interest and equality
and that Albania would follow the principle of non-interference in the
internal affairs of other Countries and on the other hand strictly and
rigorously applying the norm of not making concessions to foreign companies
and multinationals, be they joint ventures or financial and economical
foreign institutions, Albania safeguarded jealously its independence. Albanian
leadership even sanctioned this Realist policy in the last Communist Constitution
that Albania does not make business «with monopolies and the capitalist
States–be they bourgeoisie or revisionist States, and it does not take
any kind of debt or financial credits from them» (11).
In this context, Tirana sought, and managed to create
a new set of relationships within the international organizations. The
interesting side of all this is that Tirana developed these relationships
on certain original arguments and strangely enough, staying away of the
ideological, economical and strategical premises that continued to dominate
international relations of the time but also staying away of the fashionable
labels of the time such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries or Third
World Countries, etc. At the same time, Tirana continued to support Countries
that opposed the aggressive and bellicose politics, racism, neo-colonialism,
hegemonism, and everything else of the kind always from within a Realist
perspective but carefully buttressed with Marxist Leninist arguments. Albania
opposed indiscriminately to all the tentatives of the two superpowers (USA
and USSR) arguing that they sought to monopolize and control the global
leadership and become the uncontested referees of the international game.
In particular, Albania strongly opposed to the Soviet Union and its concept
of “the special responsibility” that was used to justify their interventions
and their influence on the Third World Countries. Placed in this Cold War
context, one must say that Albania played a very unique role in the international
stage.
It is not possible to exhaust the entire set of Albania’s
foreign policy especially during such a prolonged period of time, rich
in events and characterized by an intense diplomatic activity. I have chosen
to focus on a handful of significant and revealing historical moments such
as the extraordinary Albanian contribution to the clarification of the
role of the UN in 1965, the Albanian fight for the admission of People’s
Republic of China in UN. The two cases regarding the Albanian diplomatic
manoeuvres in the UN, demonstrate sufficiently that Albania used in an
excellent way the diplomatic means at its disposal to influence the functioning
of the entire international system.
4. The Albanian Contribution to Role of the United Nations (1965)
As the American scholar M.J. Peterson has argued, while
the role of a great power might be played only by strong States, the rules
of the General Assembly allow a weak State to assume any other, including
the traditional role of mediator (12).
Peterson has argued that the perfect example of a weak State which carved
a role for itself in the 1960s and early 1970s and which commanded considerable
attention from other members was Albania (13).
Peterson, following an earlier analysis by Volgy (14),
suggests that Albanian prominence in the General Assembly stemmed largely
from Albania’s acting as a proxy for People’s Republic of China and minimizes
the independent component, that is, the conscious Albanian decision to
take an “outsider” role (15).
This article argues that the “outsider” role assumed
by Albania had nothing to do with PR of China, but for all matters and
purposes reflected the fundamentals of Albania’s foreign policy described
in the second section. While one cannot deny the fact that in many occasions,
Albania did not acted as a proxy for PR of China, the fact that, even after
the break with PR of China, Albania did not change its political stance
as an “outsider” runs against the argument advanced by Peterson. One might
argue that the Albania’s persistence in denouncing the great powers was
not compatible with Chinese interests. Case in point, is the Albanian denouncing
of the any form of cooperation between the superpowers as elements of a
program to establish a global condominium. Albania persisted in denouncing
it even after PR of China had dropped that policy line in 1972. However,
the best example of the role of Albania as a first hand “outsider” player
in the General Assembly, an example that abundantly supports my argument
is the Albanian role in the 19th Session. As Peterson himself notes «Albanian
delegates tried to force that would have wrecked the understanding under
which the session was meeting…» (16).
I argue that Albanians did force a vote and that particular vote had serious
consequences for the activity of the UN. If we look at this event we would
see no particular element that could link Albanian diplomacy actions to
any Chinese interest. It was a conscious decision taken by the Albanians,
fully compatible with their foreign policy towards international organizations,
and, especially, toward the UN.
Although today the following case study might appear
to be just a minor diplomatic incident, it did not appear so in 1965. It
was considered by many analysts to be a turning point in the history of
the United Nations and especially in defining the area of activity of the
General Assembly of the United Nations versus that of the Security Council.
The reason why this case is significant stands in the fact that through
a clever interpretation of the international law, Albania managed to give
more autonomy to the General Assembly and to make inevitable the creation
of the General Committee of the General Assembly. The Albanian intervention
took place during the 19th ordinary Session of the General Assembly of
the United Nations which was held in New York from December 1,1964 till
February 18, 1965. This Session was paralyzed from a crisis without precedents
in the history of the United Nations. The crisis had started when the United
States of America decided to seek the application of the Art. 19 of the
UN Charter to a number of States (Soviet Union, France, etc.) in order
to get the payment of the quotas intended to cover the expenses meet during
the UN peace-keeping operations (17).
The Article 19 of the UN Charter says that if a member of the United Nations
which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the
Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of
its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from
it for the preceding two full years (18).
However, a tacit agreement between Washington and Moscow had created a
precedent that in the General Assembly would be presented and approved
only the resolutions that obtained the unanimous consensus. The intention
of the United States and Soviet Union was to avoid the arguments that could
not otherwise be avoided in such a diversified assembly. Moreover, an abandonment
of the unanimous consensus would have forced the respective diplomacies
to take diametrically opposed positions that through the use of a roll-call
vote would lead to an intensification of conflict. In addition to that,
a roll-call vote meant that small States would have a grater voce in
capitolo, something that under the circumstances was judged as undesirable
by the members of the Security Council. By avoiding the roll-call vote,
the superpowers had managed to weaken the operational capacity of the United
Nations and the General Assembly was transformed into an institution that
approved the resolutions that passed by unanimous consensus.
It must be noted that the debate over the financial obligations
barely concealed the deep contradictions that existed then and that continue
to exist even to this day between the member Countries in their quality
of great, average or small powers. Moreover, the debate concealed the deep
friction between the General Assembly, where average Countries make up
the absolute majority, and the Security Council conditioned from the veto
of the great Powers. The situation got worse because the Great Powers represented
in the Security Council had no intention of giving up their privileged
position. Therefore, they strenuously opposed to an expansion of the powers
of the General Assembly. The various initiatives such as expanding the
Security Council from 11 to 15 members and then increasing the membership
of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 and sometimes later to
54 members were aimed towards the sidelining of the General Assembly. To
the stagnation and the worsening of the situation contributed the fact
that the Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union
always agreed in limiting the powers of the General Assembly. It is safe
to say that the immediate consequence of their agreement was the complete
paralysis of the United Nations which has begun to move on its own only
after the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. In 1965, Albania shocked the immobilism
of the United Nations and indicated the danger hidden after the lack of
the proper application of the entire system of the international security
as foreseen in the United Nations Charter. For Albania, «the inability
of the United Nations to act in fulfillment of its duties in agreement
with provisions of the Charter has been demonstrated in numerous cases
of aggression and violation of the sovereignty of the independent States» (19).
Only three years after this Statement would come the occupation of Czechoslovakia
by the Soviet Union and the United Nations were not able to do anything
but passively and helplessly assist to the occupation of a founding member.
On February 1, 1965, U Thant, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations reminded the General Assembly that at the opening of
the 19th Ordinary Session, was reached an agreement that restricted the
matters to be disputed in the Assembly only to those that could be resolved
by unanimous consent. Furthermore, argued the Secretary General, since
the debates were closed, the General Assembly had to decide on the procedures
that had to adopt for the remaining part of the Session. In the next meeting
of the General Assembly on February 8, 1965, U Thant stated his conviction
that the prevailing opinion among the various delegations present at the
Session was that – once an agreement was reached on the organization of
the peace keeping operations and on the solution of other issues that were
essential to the proceedings and included in the order of the day – the
19th Ordinary Session was to be adjourned. During the same meeting, the
General Assembly agreed to this proposal.
However, at the meeting of February 16, 1965, just at
the moment when the President of General Assembly, the Ghanian Alex Quaison-Sackey
was ringing the bell to start the session, the Albanian Representative
to the United Nations, Ambassador Halim Budo requested permission to speak.
Reminding the General Assembly that in a previous meeting, that of December
29, 1964, the Albanian delegation had already expressed its strong reservations
with regard to the irregular procedures adopted for the workings of the
General Assembly, Ambassador Budo argued that the unanimous consensus procedure
must be applied only during the general debates of the General Assembly,
as the Secretary U Thant had himself previously declared. According to
observers «the Albanian demand had the effect of a bomb falling in
the General Assembly» (20).
Representatives of the numerous African and Asiatic Countries
were applauding enthusiastically and voicing great support for the request
made by Budo. To a request made by Quaison-Sackey to allow the General
Assembly to proceed with its work, Budo replied that he did not think that
the General Assembly could go forward without considering the Albanian
request adding that the Albanian position and request remained unchanged.
Furthermore, Budo requested that the meeting of the General Assembly continue
according to the Regulation of the General Assembly and the Charter of
the United Nations which should have been applied to the letter to the
proceedings of the Session. Budo’s request was that the General Assembly
must create the General Committee and approve the order of the day in order
to start without any delay the study of the requests posed to the General
Assembly.
Some speakers (for example, the representatives of Saudi
Arabia and Ethiopia), requested that Albania reconsider its own position,
and at the same time, arguing that they had to consult with their respective
governments, they demanded the adjournment of the meeting. In spite of
that, the Albanian representative remained firm in his stand and his request
remained unchanged. The Albanian Representative was insisting that before
the Session was adjourned, the General Assembly had to decide by a general
vote, whether it must resume its meetings normally or not. To a Statement
by the President of the General Assembly that the General Assembly could
continue with its activity and sometimes later examine the Albanian request,
Budo replied that his proposal had to be examined with absolute precedence
over all the other matters.
Then, the President of the General Assembly argued that
the General Assembly had accepted the procedure defined by the Secretary-General,
that is, it had accepted to suspend its workings after an agreement on
the mechanisms aimed to define the peace-keeping operations had been reached.
According to the Statute of the General Assembly, it was indispensable
to have a two-thirds majority in order to overturn a previous decision
made by General Assembly. Otherwise, the points of the order of the day
had to be presented according to the Article 80 of the General Assembly
Statute which states that proposals and amendments shall normally be introduced
in writing and handed to the Secretary-General who shall circulate copies
to the delegations. Moreover, this article stated that no proposal shall
be discussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the General Assembly
unless copies of it have been circulated to the members. However, according
to the Guinean representative Achkar Marof who intervened in the debate,
since Albania had the right to present a point of the order, the Article
80 could not be invoked. The General Assembly had to be adjourned to allow
the various delegations to consult their own governments (21).
The numerous following interventions made it clear that most delegations
were in favor of adjournment (Liberia, Cameroon, Sweden, Cyprus, Uruguay,
Nigeria), and the President of the General Assembly postponed the discussion.
In the meeting of the February 18, the Albanian representative’s
speech was interrupted by the President of the General Assembly who reminded
Ambassador Budo that Albania had previously requested to proceed immediately
to a general vote on the proposal that the General Assembly carry out its
normal course of work and elect a General Committee. Nevertheless, added
the President, he was bound by the decision taken on February 8 and applied
on February 10, to resolve these matters and therefore to postpone the
Session. Now, inclined to avoid the vote – so long as the General Assembly
did not change its mind – the President argued that he was forced to follow
the procedure of consensus against that of the revision. However, the Ambassador
Budo after having protested for the interruption, presented a formal request
that the General Assembly begin its ordinary work conform to the Charter
of the UN and the Statute of the General Assembly (22).
Budo insisted that the Albanian point of the order must be examined with
absolute precedence over any other issue, and that the General Assembly
had to take a decision on that issue with absolute precedence. The decision,
insisted Budo, had to be taken through a roll-call vote:
5. The struggle for the Admission of China to UN.
Several States–India in 1950 (27)
and Soviet Union in 1961 and 1962 (28)
had attempted to reinstate People’s Republic of China (Mainland China)
to the United Nations and Security Council and had failed. Beginning in
1963, Albania, by now in a close bilateral alliance with PR of China, prepared
and presented a series of eight resolutions that one after the other (except
in 1964) , were discussed time and again until 1971, the year when Beijing
was recognized the right to represent China in the United Nations. The
eight year battle that the Albanian diplomacy fought in New York was not
centered only in managing to convince the General Assembly to recognize
Beijing as the representative of 700 million people but primarily to demolish
the resolution “important question”: a bulwark created to guarantee the
seat to Zhang Gaishek and the Republic of China (Taiwan).
On December 15, 1961 the General Assembly had approved
a United States project (signatories included Australia, Colombia, Japan
and Italy) Resolution 1668 (XVI) that invited the general Assembly to «decide
according to the Article 18 of United Nations Charter that every proposal
intended to modify the representation of China be considered an “important
question”» (29).
This signified that the eventual admission of the PRC had to be taken with
«a majority of two-thirds of members present and voting» (30).
However, the successive annual reconfirmation’s of the resolution “important
question” – according to the Article IX, paragraph 3 – would state simply,
the majority of the members present and voting. The diplomatic victory
of Albania was not manifested suddenly in 1971 but was the result of a
long and tireless effort accomplished in the United Nations and the capitals
of various States whose results were consolidated in time.
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Table 1. Projects of the Albanian Resolution. Sources: International Organization XVIII 1964: 345-346; Yearbook of the United Nations XIX 1965: 176-180; Yearbook of the United Nations XX 1966: 133-138; Yearbook of the United Nations XXI 1967: 133-140; Yearbook of the United Nations XXII 1968: 160-168; Yearbook of the United Nations XXIII 1969: 153-158; Yearbook of the United Nations XXIV 1970: 194-200; Yearbook of the United Nations XXV 1971: 126-137.
As I have already noted the Albanian contribution does
not consist in the admission of PR of China. It must be pointed out that
the United States, the President Richard Nixon and the Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger had managed to reformulate the United States policy towards
PR of China. One of the guarantees sought by Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier
was the reinstatement of China to the UN. The thorny question was the status
of Republic of China (Taiwan). There was substantial support for the theory
of two China’s in many capitals of the world. Yet, the number of members
of the UN who were not favorable to the resolution “Important Question”
jumped from 40.2 per cent in 1961 to 57.4 per cent in 1971; coniunctis
passibus the number of Countries that were not opposed to the Albanian
resolution reached the 72.7 per cent from 48.2 percent of 1963 as we can
see from the Table 2 below.
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Table 2. The Resolution Important Question in the United Nations, 1961-1971. Sources: International Organization XVI 1962: 99-102; Yearbook of the United Nations XIX 1965: 177, 179; Yearbook of the United Nations, XX 1966: 137; Yearbook of the United Nations XXI 1967: 139; Yearbook of the United Nations XXII 1968: 166-167; Yearbook of the United Nations XXIII 1969: 158; Yearbook of the United Nations XXIV 1970: 199-200; Yearbook of the United Nations, XXV 1971: 136.
Although other factors were involved, once again has to mention the softening of the United States position towards China in 1970-1971, ultimately one has to recognize that this was undoubtedly a success for the Albanian diplomacy. What is most striking in Tirana’s position if we leave aside political arguments and plausible historical conclusions is its perfect juridical interpretation of the vexata quaestio. As Nesti Nase, then Foreign Minister and head of Albanian delegation observed on October 18, 1971,
Conclusion
There was no doubt that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist block, Albania could not resist to the pressures to change. Thus, with the transformation of the international relations system, the end of Cold War, and in 1991 after fifty years of absolute rule came the unconditional surrender of the Albanian Communists – the first to come to power without a sponsor and the last to fall. The difficult process of the reintegration of Albania in the structures of the international system has had great consequences on the prestige and the conduct of the Albanian foreign policy. Until 1991, although Albania was autarchic and independent – Albanian membership in the international organizations was limited to the United Nations – still it could influence the international system as witnessed by the two cases presented above. During the last six years since the overthrow of Communism, Albania has become a member of numerous international organizations and its integration in the system has created new problems and has required the formulation of new policies. The latest events in Albania, though, have tarnished its reputation and have become the last sign of decline of an unforgettable chapter of the international diplomatic history. While Albanian diplomacy is exploring new frontiers and is confronting delicate situations in Balkans, its long chapter of a maverick State obsessed with its independence, and yet, a reliable element of the international system and of stability in the region is closed, apparently, for good.
Notes
(1) Albania was occupied by Italy in April
7, 1939 and then when Marshal Badoglio switched to the Allies, Albania
was occupied by the German III Reich in September 1943. It remained occupied
until the liberation of the whole Country on November 29th, 1944.Up
(2) The Congress was hold from May 24 to May
28, 1944 in the Southern town of Përmeti. In many aspects it laid
the foundations of the future Communist regime. See Historia e Shqipërisë,
[The History of Albania], Vol. III. Tirana: Albanian Academy of
Sciences: Tirana, 1984: 588-589.Up
(3) See Enver Hoxha, I Titisti. Tirana:
Casa Editrice "8 Nëntori", ed. it., 1982.Up
(4) Although Albanians are an ethnie, they
nominally belong to three different religions, Muslims, Orthodox, and Roman
Catholics. Besides that the regional identity was pretty strong at least
until recently. One cannot fail to mention that the extended family - one
dare not call it clan - remains the central institution of Albanian society.Up
(5) Queen Teuta became the ruler of the Illyrian
State of Ardians after the death of her husband Agron in 231 BC. She died
after the First Illyrian-Roman war of 229-228 BC.Up
(6) «The soldiers of the Danubian Army,
the majority of whom came from the Illyrian provinces , from then on, had
a tremendous influence even on the government, and, since the army created
the Emperors, even these were in large part Illyrians.» Theodor Mommsen,
L’Impero
di Roma, Milano: Dall’Oglio, vol.I, 1982: 278. Later on, even the Ottoman
Empire followed the same policy.Up
(7) For a consideration of these period see
Arben Puto and Stefanaq Pollo, L’Histoire de l’Albanie des Origins à
Nos Jours. Paris: Editions Horvath, 1981: Chapters X and XI. For the
pro-Yugoslav view of these relations see an earlier work by V. Didejer,
ed. Il Sangue Tradito: Relazioni Jugoslavo-Albanesi, 1938-1949. Documenti
ufficiali, lettere, fotografie, memoriali co-ordinati ed elaborati,
Varese, 1949.Up
(8) Elez Byberaj, Albania and China, A
Study of an Unequal Alliance. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986: 142.Up
(9) Albania had adhered to the Treaty of Warsaw
in 1955. However, it refused to recognize the Soviet dominance and de
facto abandoned the Treaty. Officially though, it denounced the Warsaw
Treaty after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.Up
(10) Wojciech Morawiecki, "Institutional
and Political Conditions of Participation of Socialist States in International
Organizations". International Organization 22 1968: 502.Up
(11) Art. 26/2. The Constitution of the
People’s Socialist Republic of Albania, Tirana, 1976.Up
(12) M.J. Peterson, The General Assembly
in World Politics. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986: 224.Up
(13) Ibidem.Up
(14) Thomas Volgy, “Reducing Conflict in
International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, 18 1974:
179-210; and Thomas Volgy, “The Role of ‘Outsider’ in Quasi-Legislative
Systems”, International Organization 27 1973: 86-97.Up
(15) Peterson, op. cit., p. 224.Up
(16) Ibidem.Up
(17) William Tung, International Organization
Under the United Nations System. New York: Thomas Crowell Co, 1969:
266. See also Statuto delle Nazione Unite e Statuto della Corte Internazionale
di Giustizia. Roma: Centro di Informazione delle Nazione Unite, 1983:
11-12.Up
(18) Tung, op. cit. p. 266.Up
(19) The Speech held by Mr. Halim Budo, the
Albanian Representative at the United Nations on February 16, 1965. UN
Monthly Chronicle, II Number 3 1965:10.Up
(20) Le Monde, February 18, 1965.Up
(21) S.D. Bailey, The General Assembly
of the United Nations - A Study of Procedure and Practice, London,
1960: 289. Also in Tung, op. cit. p. 323.Up
(22) International Legal Materials,
IV 1965:371.Up
(23) Ibidem.Up
(24) S.D. Bailey, op.cit. p. 287;
Tung, op.cit. p. 322.Up
(25) During the discussion of any matter,
a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall
be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of
procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President.
The appeal shall be immediately put to vote and the President’s ruling
shall stand unless overruled by a majority of members present and voting.
A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance
of the matter under discussion. Ibidem.Up
(26) The Times, London, February 17,
1965.Up
(27) The Indian project A/1365 was put to
vote on September 19, 1950. while 16 States were favorable to the admission
of China, 33 were against and ten abstained. The project was voted down.
The
Year Book of the United Nations, IV 1950: 429.Up
(28) The first Soviet project A/L 360 was
put to vote on December 15, 1961. While 36 States voted in favor of admission
of China to the UN, 48 were against and twenty abstained. The second Soviet
project, A/L 395 was put to vote on October 30, 1962. This time 42 States
were favorable to the admission of China but the number of States against
the admission had increased substantially to 56 due to the incidents between
China and India, and twelve abstained. International Organization
XVI 1962: 98-102 and International Organization XVII 1963: 127-129.Up
(29) Tung, op.cit. p. 266.Up
(30) Ibidem.Up
(31) The Speech by Nesti Nase, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the PRA. General Assembly Official Records, 25th
Session. Plenary Meetings (1913th meeting) Number 24.Up
(32) Benedetto Conforti, Le Nazioni Unite.
Padova: CEDAM, 1986: 97. Also Jean Charpentier, "La procédure
de non objection (A propos d’une crise constitutionelle de l’O.N.U.)".
Revue
Générale de Droit International Public, LXX 1966: 862-77.Up
(33) A/8392. The 16 cosignatory States were
predominantly Third World Countries: Algeria, People’s Republic of Congo,
Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania,
The Arab Republic of Yemen, DPR of Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Yearbook
of the United Nations, XXV 1971:135.Up
(34) A/L 630 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1, 2. The
six other cosignatory Countries were Burma, Ceylon (today Sri Lanka), Equatorial
Guinea, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone. Ibidem. p.126.Up
(35) For the full text of the United States
project A/8442 see International Legal Materials X 1971:1100.Up
(36) Ibidem.Up
(37a) A/L. 632 and Add. 1,2. The cosignatory
Countries were: Australia, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Fiji, The Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho,
Liberia, Mauritius, Nicaragua, New Zealand, The Philippines, Swaziland,
Thailand and Uruguay. Yearbook of the United Nations, XXV 1971:
136.Up
(37b) A/L. 633 and Add. 1,2. The cosignatory
Countries were: Australia, Bolivia, Chad, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Fiji, The Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius,
New Zealand, The Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand and Uruguay. Ibidem.Up
© Giovanni Armillotta, 1998